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A S"Forecasting is simply good analysis"
V.L. Bassie, Economic Forecasting,
New York 1958, preface
I. Recent Experiences
In Germany since early 1981 a consensus has emerged pre-
dicting that an economic recovery is due for the second
half of the year. This forecast of an upturn was put-forth
for 1981 and for 1982. Despite these consensus, the fore-
casts proved to be wrong. Nonetheless in autumn 1982 the
consensus forecast for 1983 again explicitly included a
recovery starting mid-year, and again the forecast seems
to be proving to be wrong. This time, however, the failure
is not forecasting a recovery, only to find out its not
there, but rather miscalculating in the other direction as
the economic recovery has already been' on the move since
the beginning of 1983. •
Another startling example of failures of macro-economic
forecasts is that of the United States in recent years.
Almost uninterruptedly the forecasts have proved to per-
form poorly. In late 1979 the forecast recession did not
materialize, then the massive GNP drop in 1980 came to
everybody's surprise, as did the mild recovery in late
1980 and the Reagan euphoria in early 1981. The sobering
weak performance of the economy thereafter, entering the
second part of the recession, did not help forecasters to
avoid the disastrous forecasting errors for 1982, when the
end of the recession was unanimously seen as starting by
mid-1982 at the latest.
These observations make model builders and other fore-
casting experts believe that major economic relationships
and reaction parameters suffered a structural break at the- 2 -
beginning of the eighties. Models based on the historical
experience of postwar-cycles would thus no longer be
capable of capturing events. One important feature of most
econometric models is the impact of fiscal policy. It
seems as if first of all the behavior of fiscal policy
authorities has changed - the tendency now is more to
reduce the government budget deficit than to behave anti-
cyclically. Secondly, that economic agents react differ-
ently to fiscal actions. The most striking case in point
is the failure of the US-tax cut in mid-1982 to ignite a
private spending recovery.
But not only these modifications made forecasting more
difficult. Financial innovations in many countries, in the
UK and the US in particular, made the analysis of monetary
policy much more difficult.
On top of these factors come uncertainties due to the
international liquidity crisis and the problems of chang-
ing governments, especially in Germany in early autumn
1982.
II. What Are Macro-economic Forecasts All about ?
The Forecast Variables
In the general discussion macro-economic forecasting is
often identified as giving real GNP numbers for the next
half of a business cycle. In continental Europe it is even
more limited, since forecasts are hardly made for more
than a year and a half.
These year-over-year figures for real GNP for the current
or the next year are what the average citizen thinks
macro-economic forecasting is all about.- 3 -
This judgement, however, is a massive understatement. In-
stead, macroeconomic forecasting consists of variables in
absolute or money terms (labor input - persons or hours -,
number of unemployed, short time-workers, expenditure
categories like consumption, investment, inventories,
exports and imports) and of prices (deflators for various
GNP components, the consumer price index, import- and
export prices, including exchange rates - within the EMS,
against floating currencies, measured as effective ex-
change rates - wages and interest rates).
Additionally, nominal categories of many mentioned vari-
ables are calculated; figures on the current account bal-
ance, the government budget and monetary expansion comple-
ment the list of forecast variables. While productivity
figures and income distribution can be derived from the
above mentioned forecast variables, numbers for the po-
tential growth rate and the labor force are "autonomous"
inputs for a series of behavioral equations.
Macro-economic forecasting has a wide spectrum of time
horizons. At the very short end experts in the U.S. try to
forecast next week's money supply figures. More common are
attempts to guess next month's data for industrial pro-
duction, the inflow of new orders, the inflation rate or
the current account. Mostly, however, one would identify
macroeconomic forecasting as the attempt to get hold of a
view for the coming quarters, the next year or at a maxi-
mum the next cyclical turning point. The standard pro-
cedure in the U.S. is a forecast period of some 10 quar-
ters ahead. In continental Europe the standard is to fore-
cast for the current or - at the most - for the coming
year (in year-over-year, numbers) . While those exercises
concentrate on the analysis of demand-side influences,- 4 -
whether Keynesian-type or monetarist, a supply side view -
as a rule - leads to a more long run analysis of 5 to 15
years. Then the efforts shift to the analysis of demo-
graphic and labor force trends, technology and the
(changing) pattern of economic policy reaction functions.
3._ ^§thodolo2Y_behind_Macroeconomic_Forecasting
There is no standard body of methodology used in macro-
economic forecasting. The techniques differ over time, by
education, by character, technical equipment and taste.
While Germans as a rule prefer the informal, more descrip-
tive approach, the Scandinavians, Dutch, Belgiums, French
and Anglosaxons, including the Japanese, prefer a more
formal, often more quantitative approach. This is not only
reflection of a German-Swiss antipathy against planning
and measuring the economy and steering it by means of
economic policy, but also is due to a lack of mathematical
education, a lack of an efficient information system
(impact of the inflexible state telecommunication monopoly
in this field and its implications for the cost of infor-
mation plus the speed of implementation of new tech-
niques) . Both factors have had an impact on the type of
macroeconomic courses in German universities.
The question as to which approach is most suitable for
macro-economic forecasting is actually an incorrectly
posed question. It is obvious from theoretical as well as
empirical considerations that there is not a single (metho-
dological) answer to the wide spectrum of questions put
before the macro-economic forecaster.
The length of the time horizon of a forecast is as crucial
a factor for the choice of a certain approach as is the
type of the variable, which should be forecast.- 5 -
Whether single equations, partial models of a sector or a
market, or fully developed interlinked national or even
international models should be chosen, is a matter of
theoretical and empirical concern. It is doubtful whether
a fully internationally linked model, including trade,
capital, labor and information links, is- theoretically
superior, if - as is the case - you have to box it in the
existing (partly misleading) statistics.
From a more practical standpoint, enhanced by some empiri-
cal work with those more or less fully endogenized models,
a less ambitious approach often- seems to be more ef-
ficient.
The very fact, that in recent years the importance of the
lagged endogenous variable as an "explanatory" variable
increased in almost all models is a hint towards the fore-
casting power of autoregressive processes, especially for
short-run-forecasts.
In many cases, short-run forecasts for a series of vari-
ables is very effectively possible by engaging in uni-
lateral autoregressive processes. In many cases and for
many countries such approaches have produced remarkably
good results. If it is true that there has been a struc-
tural shift in most economies in recent years, then one
reason for the good performance of autoregressive esti-
mates is obvious: such equations are less burdened with
outdated structures and by definition adjust to changing
times. But it should be added - the evidence in favor of
autoregressive procedures is not always overwhelming,
particularly as the selection of the weighting and smooth-
ing process is quite time-consuming-
Forecasting with a single equation regression model might
seem here to be a re'al alternative > that is, particularly
where theoretical underpinnings, are. straight forward and- 6 -
past experience seems promising, do such methods offer a
relatively quick and easy solution. A case in point here
is a simple equation used at the Kiel Institute since 1976
to supplement traditional forecasting techniques. The
equation - estimated with yearly data - forecasts changes
in real domestic expenditures in Germany using changes in
monetary balances (Ml) and prices (the deflator for dom-
estic expenditures) as explanatory variables.
For short-term forecasting it is important that the ex-
planatory variables are known with certainty or can be
easily predicted. Because the effects of government ac-
tivity are difficult to predict we use a rather general
formulation where changes in economic activity (AY) are
solely explained by current and lagged changes of monetary
balances (AM) and prices (AP).
Normally changes in real gross national product are used
as an output measure, but in an open economy, with a large
foreign sector, changes in real domestic expenditures
(real gross national product minus real exports plus.real
imports) are more appropriate to measure the output ef-
fects of changes in monetary balances. Corresponding to
the definition of the selected output variable, changes in
the deflator of domestic expenditures are used as the
price variable. The incorporation of changes in prices
(AP) as an exogenous variable is surprising. However, in
the Federal Republic of Germany price increases in the
short-run cannot be explained only by changes in monetary
balances. Instead the price performance is strongly in-
fluenced by changes in the terms of trade, mainly stemming
from changes in the exchange rates. As far as the choice
of the appropriate monetary aggregate is concerned,
changes in the narrow monetary aggregate M, (currency in
See Langfeldt, Enno, -"Experiences in forecasting short-
term economic activity in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many with a single-equation model."' Kiel, mimeo, 1982.- 7
circulation plus demand deposits) shows the closest rela-
tionship, to changes in real domestic, expenditures.
The changes of the variables in the equation have been
expressed as first differences of their logarithmic
values. Using ordinary least squares, a regression with
yearly data for the period 1957 to 1980 yielded the fol-
lowing results (t-statistics in brackets) - .
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A useful test for a forecasting model is to consider its
forecasting ability relative to other forecasts. Therefore
we will now compare the predictions on the basis of the
described single equation regression model to the fore-
casts done "intuitively" by the Kiel Institute and by the
association of the five leading economic institutes. We
compare forecasts for the change . in real domestic expen-
ditures made in autumn for the following year.
The forecast errors of the different models are shown in
Table 1. The forecasts of the Kiel Institute and the joint
forecast of the five Institutes show up approximately the
same predictions errors. This is not too surprising, for
the Kiel Institute takes part in the joint forecast. Com-
pared to the "intuitive" forecast of the Kiel Institute
and the joint forecast of the five institutes the pre-
dictive ability of the. single-equation-regression model is
relatively better.
The 'traditional' short-term cyclical forecasts are to a
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Kiel Institute of World Economics, Die Weltwirtschaft;
own calculations- 9 -
dynamics and stick to the growth rate of potential output.
Therefore in a recession (1975) larger overpredictions
occur, while in a boom (1979) economic activity is under-
predicted. The regression model seems to predict the cy-
clical behavior of the economy more accurately. Therefore
it seems to be rather helpful especially in forecasting
cyclical turning points.
Since every econometric forecast includes not only lagged
exogenous variables, the process of forecasting the ex-
planatory variables for the current period introduces
additional potential errors which can ruin the predictive
performance of the regression model. This is no doubt
caused by the offsetting prediction errors between AM and
AP - due to the implicitly captured policy reaction func-
tion - being inherent to the equation.
In moving beyond such simple but not ineffective methods
into the world of multi-equation models the problems en-
countered should by no means be underestimated, particu-
larly in light of the fact that the more time and effort
required for the more sophisticated models does not mean
more reliable results. As a matter of fact in an investi-
gation of 5 large econometric models in the U.S.A. -
ranging in size from 81 to 831 equations - there was even
a negative correlation between size and performance based
on key variables.In light of such findings the obvious
question must be answered as to why larger models are
built if they don't offer us more. First of all they allow
a better specification of relevant variables. Second, by
including the relevant variables, correlations between
residuals can be reduced. Third, by accounting for a large
number of explanatory variables error variances can be
reduced. Despite these advantages tests have shown that a
simple autoregressive rabbit - just hopping along - can- .10 -
beat the biggest and most sophisticated models (Cooper,
1972) . Such an attack is and was taken seriously (Howrey,
Klein and McCarthy, 1974) and rebuttals brought forth, the
ingredients necessary to make the large models produce
sensible results. They are
a - specification
b - sample selection
c - estimation
d - application, including prediction, ; :
simulation and analysis. •
But overriding and permeating all four of these points is
something ..called "tender loving care" - TLC for short.
What TLC means is simply that although theoretical know-
ledge dictates the basic structure of the models, reaction,
parameters and hence lag structures - be they negative or
positive - are subjected to a great deal of intuition plus
trial and error. Thus models once set up are not finished
products - they must continually be given TLC and cor-
rected when the results begin to go astray.
In many cases built-in controls exist to keep models from
producing totally nonsensical results when they are run
over longer periods of time. For instance take the case of
the IBM model in the early 70 's. Here a "ceiling" was
inserted which kept the U.S. unemployment rate from going
too high - i.e. an operation stated if the (forecasted)
unemployment rate is greater than 7.5 %, the unemployment
rate equals 7.5 %. Obviously the higher unemployment rates
in the U.S.A. in the mid 70's and later .on meant that the
model was given a good deal of tender loving care.
In many cases, however, it's not the lack of TLC which
causes models to produce incorrect or unreliable resulfs,
but rather the failure to include essential variables in a- 11 -
manner congruent with their importance. It is not ne-
cessary to delve into the differences between Keynesian
and monetarist philosophies to elaborate on this aspect,
the foreign sector offers a prime example. That,is, most
models are specifically designed; for a certain country
with demand from abroad, exchange rates and capital flows
entering the picture in an exogenous and predetermined
fashion. The interdependent world we live in is.thus in-
adequately taken into consideration,, despite the en-
largement of the EEC and despite the multilateral tariff
reductions carried out over the last 25 years. This is not
to say, however, that progress hasn't been made in incor-
porating, foreign developments in a more explicit fashion,
as large-scale linked models have been developed and put
to use in recent years. But these models - even if each
sub-model within a given world model was created with the
same theoretical underpinnings in mind - are plaqued by
the same problems playing simple models: forecasting ex-
change rate changes. While the consequences of this weak-
ness obviously cannot be overlooked in those countries
heavily dependent on foreign trade, not even in the United
States can the foreign sector be subjected to passing
thoughts only: Although foreign trade accounts for only
about one sixth of GNP, about one third of corporate
profits have come from abroad in recent years.
Whatever type of model is consulted or depended upon the
user must be sure that the demands he places on the re-
sults are part and parcel of the model-builders' inten-
tions. That is, all models and forecasts are designed to
fulfill certain purposes, and to overinterpret the results
means stepping into no-man's-land. The joint forecast of
the major economic research institutes in Germany issued
just over two weeks ago is an example of a set of numbers
which indeed sounds impressive. But since the forecasts
are basically a compromise, their wording is usually cast- 12 -
in terms which can only be completely understood by those
who participated in preparing them. While an indication
about the degree of disagreement can be gained from the
extent to which dissentions exist, more reliability could
be gained by comparing the spread of the forecast from the
individual institutes themselves. In the cases where the
path is clear to all concerned, the spread will be small.
If, however, uncertainty abounds the spread will be wide
and the caution light should be blinking for those study-
ing the forecasts.
II. Forecasting Institutions, their Approaches and
Results
The question thus arises about where business forecasts
are available, what they offer and how good they are.
Let's start first of all with the country we are now in -
Germany. Aside from the above-mentioned joint forecast,
each of the five major economic research institutes pro-
duces-analyses and forecasts of various depths. The insti-
tute from which I come - the Kiel Institute of World Econ-
omics - makes four in-depth analyses and forecasts a year
for Germany and the World - that is the major•industrial-
ized countries - and a once-a-year in-depth analysis of
certain industrialized countries. While the basic method
applied in forecasting is intuitive, this does not pre-
clude using empirical techniques - as mentioned above. The
Institute has even set up a large econometric model , the
estimates of which do not always agree with those reached
by the more mundane methods - at least not before receiv-
ing a good portion of TLC.
For a recent description of the model see Tewes,
Torsten, "Okonometrische Prognose der Konjunkturent-
wicklung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bei unter-
schiedlichen Annahmen iiber Zinselastizitaten und auto-
nome Investitionen - Eine Analyse mit Hilfe des Vier-
teljahresmodells des Instituts fur Weltwirtschaft." Die
Weltwirtschaft (Tubingen), 1980, No. 1, pp. 41-59.- 13 -
The procedures in the other institutes are similar. Dif-
ferences between the institutes stem less from procedures
used than from the basic philosophies and thus the result-
ing differing interpretation of the same economic phe-
nomena. The work being done at Kiel is heavily influenced
by the monetarist thinkings - but we do not consider our-
selves to be money freaks. The general policy conclusions
and suggestions coming from the Kiel fjord are also im-
printed by the belief that it's not the economy which
needs to be helped and propped up, but rather the economy
needs the be freed from the burdens placed upon it so it
can once again function efficiently.
Other institutes reflect more the Keynesian philosophy,
while still others place a good deal of faith in sounding
out the feelings of businessmen. Also independent - like
the institutes themselves - is the German Council of
(Economic) Experts, set up in 1963 to provide a thorough
analysis of the economy once a year. Complementing these
organizations are analyses and forecasts from economic
institutes representing unions and employers, as well as
government or official institutions (like the Ministry of
Economics or the Bundesbank).
For sure the many forecasts cover a broad spectrum of
philosophies and pressure groups. But more important to
the users of forecasts is their accuracy and reliability.
As the Nobel Prize recipient Milton Friedman argued, the
only valid test of whether one's approach is correct or
not is whether the predictions are better or worse than
predictions coming from other sources. Table 2 contains a
brief listing of forecasting institutions and their accu-
racy in predicting overall real GNP since 1976. It might
be interesting to note that Kiel has been accused of bad- 14 -
Table 2 - Growth of Peal GNP (%) and Forecast Errors from
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Source: Own calculations based on statisti.cs from respective institutions.- 15 -
mouthing the economy in recent years and even causing the
recession to become worse. A more relevant question should
perhaps be asked in return: are those agencies which
always foresee a silver lining actually believed or do
they merely cause the public to become more sceptical?
In the United States, where forecasts are produced with a
speed only possible when a telecommunications system prac-
tically allows the newest statistics and revisions to be
fed directly from the source to the user's computer,
monthly updates of even the largest models are released.
Publicly financed institutions - like the institutes in
Germany - take a back seat to private organizations in the
U.S. and are primarily restricted to the federal govern-
ment (e.g. the Economic Report of the President) and the
Federal Reserve System. The private forecasters - like
Wharton, Data Resources and Chase - offer their services
with the same degree of frankness that other services are
offered, and thus monthly updates are nothing more than
the result of the TLC they give their models. Basically
speaking the philosophy of Michael Evans (formerly of
Chase Econometrics) well represents the attitude necessary
to market the models: "Often wrong but never in doubt".
The approach taken by the various institutions differs but
little. The models are basically Keynesian, although in
recent years more attention has been paid to incorporating
promising features from the neoclassical school. But even
in light of improvements made and an increase in model
size - the Wharton model (with more than 1600 equations)
has more than doubled in size over the last 10 years -
major stumbling blocks are still there. One such area is
guessing the future policy stances - here there was gen-
eral agreement when forecasts were being made for 1982
that the Fed would be loosening its hold on the expansion
of the money supply. It did, but far later than expected- 16 -•
and thus the strong upturn predicted for the second half
of 1982 did not come about. Another area where the models
do not seem to perform up to par is. in capturing the im-
pact of inflationary expectations on consumers' behavior.
This - with other problems - led to too high forecasts of
the impact of last July's 10 % tax cut.
The performance in general (see Table 3) would, seem to
have improved in recent years. Not only are the first
quarter estimates better, but in particular the estimates
for longer periods of time reveal even smaller errors.
Whether the performance really did improve is an unan-
swered question as the "shocks" in the earlier period
might well have been greater. Also interesting - but not
surprising - is that the consensus estimate is generally
better than the models.. But here we also have a case where
the object being examined is already influenced by the
object with which it is to be. compared: those in the con-
sensus group also rely on the forecasts from the models.
Unfortunately time does not allow other countries like the
United Kingdom, France, Italy.or Japan to be examined with
the same detail, as different and interesting constella-
tions are revealed. In France, for instance, there is a
large tendency to rely on the government's forecasts, come
hell or high water. In the United Kingdom, the birthplace
of so many well-known economists, forecasters were con-
tinually confronted with unforeseeable shocks - at least
until Maggie came along - that most forecasts were de-
flated with an x-factor to cover unknown but probable
problems.Table 3 - Major Forecasters in the USA: Approach and Performance
A S A/N B E R
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a Does not add to 100% due to other factors; based on 1981 information. - Calculated by subtracting
from the predicted % change (annual rate) in given period (using provisional data for. base period) the
actual % change (using revised data). -
 c Time horizon of forecast. - ^ American Statistical Association/
National Bureau of Economic Research survey of regular forecasts. -
 e.Most participants rely on in-
formal model and incorporate results of other models into forecasts. - * Bureau of Economic Analysis,
U.S. Deparment of Commerce. - 9 chase Econometrics Associates. - ^ Data Resources Incorporated. -
1 Wharton Economic Forecasts Associates, Incorporated.
I
Source: Adapted from McNees (1975 and 1981).- 18 -
Of course there are also any number of forecasts from
international organizations like the OECD, GATT, ECE, IMF,
the EEC and large banks. Even the CIA produces detailed
short-term forecasts for most countries, the quality of
which is contended to be quite good. Perhaps these fore-
casts made from the outside - where the overview might be
better - are actually better than those made on the inside
- this would not be surprising in light of the facilities
available at such institutions both in terms of infor-
mation on other countries, and equipment. A comparison of
official forecasts for six countries with those of the
OECD has been made. As it turns out (see Table 4) the OECD
does not perform better on the average, but in those cases
where it does, it reveals something about the official
forecasts in the specific countries.
In France, for instance, the errors of the official fore-
casts were on average 50 % higher than those of the OECD
and in none of the cases was the official forecast lower
than the actual, i.e. all were overpredictions. In other
words official forecasts in France reflect wishes rather
than probabilities! (It might be noted that the source is
not the newest, but it still seems to hold true in prin-
ciple .)
IV. Concluding Remarks
Permeating the entire presentation so far have been the
problems associated with predicting policy moves. While
often not even politicians know what their next policy
steps will be - although for sure a less hectic policy-
path would help both forecasters and entrepreneurs-alike -
unfortunately the problems encountered do not end there.
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Source: Adapted from Fieleke (1979).- 20 -
incomplete data have surely induced many incorrect fore-
casts as well as many an ulcer. It's not. merely that the
last months or so are adjusted for complete returns,
entire series are produced to take account of ex post
improvements. Furthermore, it is becoming an increasing
problem to determine whether the predictions one makes
have anything to do with reality. That is, the more the
government attempts to regulate and administrate, without
ensuring that the populous understands and supports such
moves, the more the underground economy grows and grows.
However, since the official statistics basically cover the
official economy-, • what meaning do forecasts for the of-
ficial economy have? A good question - and a question
which has yet to be answered. While the inaccuracy of the
statistics we must deal with usually remains hidden, every
so often prime examples become evident. Such was the case
the other day when it was reported that the current
account deficit for the world turned out to be negative by
almost 100 bill. US$ last year!! In light of such errors
the reliability of the forecasts would seem to be soundly
shaken. But estimating international flows has always been
a particular problem, even with respect to trade with
visibles. The joke that more animals are imported by coun-
try x from country y than country y exported to country x
- and procreation did not take place - is unfortunately
far too often true.
How is all this to be interpreted by users of business
cycle forecasts?
- First of all, forecasts have to be viewed with the same
grain-of-salt attitude with which they are usually pro-
duced - forecasting methods will never be able to match
crystal ball techniques.
- Second, the size and complexity of forecasting models
says nothing about the goodness of the results.- 21 -
- Third, the proof of the pudding as to how good a fore-
cast is in the result.
- Fourth, the fact that the results of a given model are
good for a given set of variables does not necessarily
mean that for another set of variables they are equally
good.
- Fifth, while a greater consensus among forecasters about
the direction and strength of the economy's growth can
be interpreted as meaning a higher probability of the
forecasts becoming reality, the crucial policy assump-
tions should be carefully and continually matched with
the actual policy stance as the forecast period pro-
gresses.
- Sixth, in evaluating the performance of forecasts par-
ticular care should be taken in differentiating between
errors caused by wrong predictions of policy parameters,
errors caused by inherent weakness and errors caused by
a poor data base.
For the forecasters - or those who want to forecast - I
might suggest the following "golden rules" (adapted from
Giersch, 1981):
1. If you can avoid it, never forecast anything!
2. If you are forced to forecast, then forecast in the
vaguest terms possible - at best without numbers.
3. If you are unfortunate enough to have to forecast with
numbers, then be vague about the time frame.
4. If, however, you have to forecast with hard numbers and
with a time frame, then forecast the past.
5. If you cannot get away with this trick, then make
several alternative predictions about the future.
6. Should this not be possible, then be optimistic.
7. If your optimism should prove to be wrong, then contend
that it was a target projection.
8. If all this proved to be useless, then just remember
that anyone else doing the same job would probably not
do any better.- 22 -
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